Bonjour from Strasbourg, France! My name is Nicholas Farnsworth and I am a
rising 2L at Regent Law. This summer, I have the distinct privilege of
interning with the European Center for Law and Justice (ECLJ) and assisting in
their efforts to protect and preserve the fundamental rights contained in the
European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter referred to as the
“Convention”). The ECLJ is the European affiliate of the American Center for
Law and Justice (ACLJ) based in Washington, D.C. In addition to conducting
legal research on various social, ethical, and political issues and hosting
conferences and seminars to promote a Christian legal perspective, the ECLJ
also submits “observations” (the equivalent of an amicus curiae brief) on
select cases to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the supranational
organ charged with adjudicating disputes under the Convention. This is the
assignment I have been working on since arriving here a week ago.
Under
the European system, citizens who believe their government has violated one of
the Convention articles are permitted to bring complaints before the ECHR after
having exhausted all available domestic remedies. Thus, on the issues covered explicitly
by the Convention: right to life, fair judicial proceedings, respect for
private and family life, freedom of expression, conscience, and religion, right
to marry and found a family, etc., the ECHR is the tribunal of last resort; its
decisions ARE the law in European states party to the Convention, so far as the
topics therein are concerned. As a consequence, the Court wields a great deal
of power and influence, particularly on matters of moral, social, and ethical
significance. This fact, coupled with the predominance of constructivist and
pragmatic thinking on the Court, has led to rampant judicial activism and the
comprehensive erosion of fundamental principles concerning the individual, the
family, and marriage, just to name a few. This is illustrated clearly by our
present case, in which the petitioner is a female-to-male transgender person
who, despite having carried a child to term, wants to be recognized by the
German government as the legal father of the child on the latter’s birth
certificate. The objective of the observations we are writing for this case is
twofold. One, to remind the Court of its proper adjudicatory limits under the
Convention; and two, to demonstrate the inextricable web of legal contradictions
a decision in favor of this petitioner would create.
Despite
having spent only a handful of days in the ECLJ office thus far, I have learned
an enormous amount about the workings of international law and how the judicial
system here differs from that of the United States. Examining the case law of
the ECHR and observing the unstable nature of its guiding principles has
deepened my appreciation for own Supreme Court, which by comparison is much
more ideologically balanced and engages in far greater self-restraint than the
ECHR. In addition, I have greatly enjoyed my immersion into the French language
and culture and am exceptionally grateful for the opportunity to make a
difference in a region of the world that desperately needs the influence of
godly leaders. Merci beaucoup et que
Dieu vous bénisse! (Thank
you and God Bless!)
This post was written by a Center for
Global Justice Intern. The views expressed in this post do not necessarily
reflect those of Regent University, Regent Law School, or the Center for Global
Justice.
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